donderdag 7 augustus 2014

Zionist Fascism 164

 
Content
Raw content
Metadata
Print
Share
Find
Show Headers
1. (C) Summary: Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon transmitted to the Security Council on May 5 his letter and summary of the Board of Inquiry's conclusions and recommendations into nine incidents involving the UN in Gaza between December 2008 and January 2009. The Security Council will discuss in informal consultations on May 7 the modalities of how to handle the Secretary-General's letter and summary. Council members will likely press for a discussion and possibly a Council product. We cannot be assured of blocking procedurally a Council discussion but can block any product (either by withholding consensus on a PRST or Press statement, or vetoing a resolution). The President of the General Assembly may also decide to call an emergency special session of the General Assembly at the request of a state or group of states. We cannot block such a session nor a product (which we expect is likely) from such a session. End summary. 2. (C) Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon transmitted to the Security Council on May 5 his letter and summary of the Board of Inquiry's conclusions and recommendations into incidents involving eight UN sites and one UN convoy in Gaza between December 27, 2008 and January 19, 2009. In his cover letter, Ban underscored that Boards of Inquiry do not consider questions of legality nor make legal findings; that Israel continues to work with the UN Secretariat to address the Board's recommendations; and that he will seek no further inquiry into matters the Board addressed which are outside its Terms of Reference, specifically its recommendation numbers 10 and 11 (see para 3). 3. (SBU) The summary of the report concludes that seven of the nine incidents covered by the report were caused by military actions of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and that the IDF breached the inviolability and immunity of UN premises, that such inviolability and immunity cannot be overridden by demands of military expediency, and that the IDF did not take sufficient precautions to fulfill its responsibilities to protect UN property and personnel and civilians taking shelter therein. The Board found the Israeli government responsible for the deaths, injuries, and physical damage that occurred in those seven cases and estimated the cost to repair damages at something over USD 11 million. The Board concluded that the damage at one site, a WFP warehouse, was caused by rocket fire by a Palestinian faction, most likely Hamas, which was intended for Israel but which fell short. Repair costs of the warehouse total USD 29,000. The Board was unable to reach any conclusions for an incident at an UNRWA school. 4. The Board concluded that no military action was carried out from within/within UN premises in any of the incidents, but it also noted that it was not within its capacity to reach conclusions on possible military activity near UN premises or possible military use of nearby buildings. The Board stated that no warnings were given to the UN before attacks on targets close to UN sites, and that it believes this could and should have been done. It found no deficiencies in UN efforts to communicate and coordinate with the IDF, and ascribes any IDF lack of awareness about UN locations or movement of UN employees to failures of communication within the IDF itself. The Board also reported that the IDF had confirmed to UNRWA at a meeting (no date given) that the IDF had not found munitions in UNRWA schools, that it recognized that UNRWA had procedures in place to protect its schools from abuse, and that it undertook to ensure that IDF troops were informed of this. 5. (SBU) The summary lists the Board's eleven recommendations of actions that the UN should take to avoid recurrence of such incidents. The recommendations are: -- 1) Seek formal acknowledgment and apology from the GoI for alleging that Palestinians fired from within the Jabalia school and the UNRWA Field Office. -- 2) Seek accountability and reparations from the responsible party for damage, death, and injury. -- 3) Promote provision of assistance to non-UN civilians killed or injured within UN premises, including medical treatment and psycho-social support. -- 4) Request the GoI to strengthen internal mechanisms to ensure that UN personnel and premises are not put at risk in any future military operations in Gaza. -- 5) Request the GoI to commit to giving the UN sufficient advance warning of any future military operations near UN premises so the UN can ensure the safety of its personnel or other civilians on the premises. -- 6) Request a commitment from the GoI that whenever the GoI USUN NEW Y 00000468 002 OF 003 believes UN premises are being misused for military purposes, the GoI will promptly convey this information to the UN. -- 7) Commend UNRWA staff for their courageous action in preventing fuel combustion at the UNRWA Field Office. -- 8) Pursue the GoI's promise to provide the UN with the results of its internal inquiry into incidents affecting UN property, and ask the GoI for a commitment that it will carry out prompt investigations in any future incidents and make the results available to the SYG and any Board of Inquiry he may establish. -- 9) Consider establishing standby arrangements to quickly deploy UN investigators. -- 10) Ensure the timely investigation of other incidents involving UN premises and personnel that were not included within the Board's ToR. -- 11) Recommend that the nine UN incidents be further investigated and that non-UN-related incidents involving civilians also be investigated as part of an impartial inquiry into "allegations of violations of international humanitarian law in Gaza and southern Israel by the IDF and by Hamas and other Palestinian militants." Possible next steps in the Council ------------------- 6. (C) The Russian Presidency will raise the Secretary-General's letter and summary under "other matters" during consultations on May 7 in order to discuss the modalities of how the Council should deal with the Board of Inquiry report. The Russian Deputy Perm Rep told Ambassador Wolff on May 5 that his delegation intends to keep any discussion of this matter within closed consultations and not have it move to a formal meeting of the Council; however, neither they nor we can completely control that outcome unless we have 6 other Council members prepared to oppose any form of session. It is not certain at this point whether we have the blocking votes. (see below). Since the Russians effectively control the Council's calendar as President, they will, however, likely ensure there is no formal Council meeting on this scheduled prior to their May 11 ministerial meeting on the Middle East. USUN believes some Council members will raise the Board's report in their national statements on May 11. 7. (C) If some members are not satisfied with discussing this in consultations, they may push for a formal Council session. Under Rule 2 of the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure, any Council member can request a meeting of the Security Council, but the meeting's agenda must be agreed upon by the Council members. If there is no consensus on the agenda among Council members, the decision would be subject to a procedural vote. If it comes to a vote, we very much doubt that we have the seven votes to prevent a formal meeting on this. In terms of timing, the next opportunity for a formal meeting of the Council would be May 12 or 13, before the Council mission to Africa departs on May 14. That Council mission returns on May 21, after which a formal meeting could also be scheduled. 8. (C) Some delegations, such as Libya, may seek a press statement, Presidential Statement, or even resolution on the Board of Inquiry conclusions. Council press statements and Presidential Statements are based on consensus, so U.S. agreement would be required. If the U.S. were the sole delegation to block a statement, that information would quickly be known publicly. Possible next steps in the General Assembly ----------------------- 9. (C) The President of the General Assembly (PGA) at the request of a majority of Members or the request of a member state with the concurrence of a majority of Members could call for a meeting of the tenth Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on "Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory" and use it to discuss the Board of Inquiry report. USUN assesses that a majority of Members would likely support such a meeting. Article 12 of the UN Charter is widely understood as providing that the General Assembly may discuss any issue, even when the Council is seized with that same issue, providing the General Assembly does not make any recommendation with regard to that issue to the Council unless the Council so requests. The General Assembly could approve a resolution on the Board of Inquiry report, as long as it does not make a specific "recommendation". A General Assembly resolution would likely include the Board of Inquiry's eleven USUN NEW Y 00000468 003 OF 003 recommendations. Rice

Geen opmerkingen:

Peter Flik en Chuck Berry-Promised Land

mijn unieke collega Peter Flik, die de vrijzinnig protestantse radio omroep de VPRO maakte is niet meer. ik koester duizenden herinneringen ...